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United States religious missionaries and faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGO) overseas are often perceived as entities that the US military cannot cooperate with during humanitarian or stability and security operations. Missionaries cite church/state restrictions or fear their use as intelligence sources as reasons to avoid cooperation. Examination of US law removes those perceived limitations while Department of Defense publications identify NGOs as legitimate players in the US Government's whole-of-government approach to stability operations. A review of the impact of faith-based organizations generally, and US missionaries specifically, reveals a global presence and legitimate roles they may be considered for as part of the Joint Force Commander's bridge to the host nation community.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Religious missionaries, Christian missionaries; faith-based organizations, FBO; non- governmental organizations, NGO; military chaplain, Joint Force Chaplain; separation of church and state; whole-of-government; religious affairs; humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, HADR; reconstruction and stability operations; military support; InterAction

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MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES

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RELIGIOUS MISSIONARY INTERACTIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES MILITARY ABROAD: HOW SHOULD THE MILITARY APPROACH THESE UNIQUE GROUPS?

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Preface

I'd like to acknowledge my wife and children who sacrificed their quality time with me over the last several months so I could research this topic. Even after several deployments, in an academic environment we still didn't get enough quality family time, so I owe you. I'd also like to acknowledge my mentor, Dr. Pauletta Otis, who encouraged me to tackle this topic even when research information was lean. She kept me on target, gaining traction and momentum when I was ready to wave-off and research a different topic.

My first introduction to the topic regarding missionary-military interaction was based on an experience of my father-in-law. He was a missionary visiting missionary friends in Djibouti who were serving as interpreters for the Marines when they came ashore there for the first time. I know missionaries who previously served on active duty and seek to work with the military when they can. I also know active duty military members who take annual leave to assist with missionaries each year overseas. There are many military members who are active in military chapels all over the world. It seemed logical to me that missionaries and the military could find ways to complement one another in a variety of ways.

In my own personal dealings with missionaries, I found they are open to my proposal.

But they know their parent organizations are often suspicious to such ideas, and this seemed to be reflected in their lack of survey response, which was disappointing. I'm certainly not suggesting that missionaries or faith-based organizations abdicate their right to not cooperate, or abandon their core values if they do. It's not difficult to find venues for missionaries to cooperate with the military, especially when innocent people are suffering. If missionary organizations do not believe even the non-religious military member desires to see a reduction in

suffering, they may have failed to understand what has transpired in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last decade.

There will always be causes to walk away from military cooperation by missionary organizations, whether due to perceived security threats or conflicting personalities. My intent is to create conversation on this issue in order for both the military and missionaries to acknowledge the areas they can have unity, communicate transparently about the areas they cannot, and determine which ones are open for negotiation or mitigation.

Executive Summary

Title: Religious Missionary Interactions with the United States Military Abroad: How Should the Military Approach These Unique Groups?

Author: Major John Michael McClendon, United States Marine Corps

Thesis: The missionary's unique capabilities and worldwide presence combined with the strong arm of the military makes for a symbiotic relationship where one organization contributes to the success of the other without competing interests.

Discussion: Missionaries and other faith-based, non-governmental organizations (NGO) have a global presence that cannot be ignored. US-based Christian missionaries account for over 127,000 of the 400,000 missionaries in 244 countries. Many of them are located in conflict areas worldwide and often fall within the US military's areas of responsibility. Thus, their global presence makes it inevitable military commanders will need to interact with them. NGOs are increasingly utilized by the US Government to provide relief both during and after military actions. And NGOs are identified as organizations that are part of the whole-of-government approach during stability and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions. Accordingly, NGOs are identified as providing gap coverage for linguistic and civil affairs teams. Due to their long-term presence pre- and post-conflict, missionaries provide linguistic skills and cultural understanding that supplement the role of any other NGO. But missionaries and faith-based NGOs often fear being used as sources of intelligence, or perceive church and state conflict by cooperating with the military. Strict laws prohibit the use of US citizens overseas as intelligence assets, and US case law has provided for the freedom of religious practice and expression in the military in accordance with the Second Amendment. Missionary organizations need to provide greater transparency and engage the military through organizations such as InterAction in order to foster better understanding between the military and missionaries.

Conclusion: The military should treat and interact with missionaries overseas as they would any other NGO. Simply classifying them as NGOs, who happen to be faith-based, creates predictability in interoperability, and facilitates guidelines for unity of effort during stressful, unpredictable circumstances.

Chapter 1: US Military Interoperability of Faith-based NGOs

The United States Government has progressively relied upon non-governmental organizations' (NGO) involvement in assisting in humanitarian relief operations both during and after military actions. Private, non-governmental religious organizations--hereafter referred to as "faith-based NGOs"--are frequently the long-term continuity as they can have a presence in a country years prior to the military's arrival and remain active in their missionary-relief role long after the military has departed. The pre-conflict presence of missionaries provides a unique faith-based NGO-military interaction. The missionary presence combined with the strong arm of the military makes for a symbiotic relationship where one organization contributes to the success of the other without competing interests.

For example, a possible scenario can be visualized when, under United Nations charter, the United States sends a Marine Corps Marine Expeditionary Unit to deescalate violence in a country in Africa. Missionaries from US faith-based NGOs are already "in country." Missionaries are then able to provide translation services for Marines, as well as identify areas in the region that require immediate humanitarian aid that are outside the missionary's scope or ability. Conversely, Marines are able to provide local security to missionary aid stations and NGO distribution sites, and quickly meet the needs of the local population by rapid distribution of aid that Marine logistical abilities provide. Through personal interviews of missionaries, examination of Department of Defense (DoD) policies, and navigating legal regulations governing church and state interactions, a wholistic view of missionary-military interactions can be assimilated that provides a framework through which missionaries and military members can effectively operate.

Chapter 2: Historical NGO Interactions

The United States has been uniquely positioned since the end of the Cold War to provide foreign aid to countries suffering the ill effects of oppressive development or failed economic policies. As the United States has become increasingly involved in foreign aid, so has the increase of military involvement as a provider of foreign aid during combat operations and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) missions. And during the last several decades, NGOs have played increasingly greater roles in providing humanitarian relief to those countries where direct US government involvement is often less visible. These charitable organizations are structured around their organization's core values and many of them are religious in nature. As such, many of these religious organizations provide para-church functions in foreign countries while providing humanitarian relief in the form of medical services and food distribution.

Churches of various denominations in the United States have created relief organizations, funded by the benevolence of their members, and assigned missionaries as representatives who are sent to foreign lands to share core values, and provide relief and assistance to oppressed peoples. Often, these missionaries are located among people groups in countries that are economically and politically unstable. Additionally, they are frequently situated in countries not always supportive of US foreign policy. Herein lies a likely hindrance for cooperation.

Many authors have previously highlighted the friction between the US Department of State and the military concerning the planning and execution of HADR operations or post-combat stability operations. The balance of military power and its security requirements are sometimes in conflict with civilian leadership's transition to social and economic stability. NGOs, because of their niche in relief support roles, can be in conflict with the military's

efficiencies in distribution efforts. The military's typically aggressive style of mission accomplishment is regularly a stark contrast to the NGO's civilian relaxed posture. NGOs are regularly confronted with the overwhelming realities of poverty and death among the people they serve every day. It is understandable that NGOs, who have been among the people for perhaps years, are less amicable towards military assistance when it appears they arrive on the scene and suddenly take on the role of "supreme provider." Even as there are personality clashes in top levels of government regarding civil-military operations, there are also personality clashes at the point of need among the people. Though often the lack of clarity through communication of intent can be largely to blame, this can typically be overcome through a sincere understanding of each organization's motives, roles, and capabilities.

But personality conflicts and barriers to communication are not the only hindrances to effective cooperation. In areas of armed conflict, the real presence of the military can cause problems, specifically for US-based NGOs who have US citizens as workers. In this instance, the threat to local security becomes the causal factor for both organizations. ¹ If the enemy observes the military providing support to the faith-based NGO, the enemy may use that as an opportunity to inflict casualties on civilians. Or, enemy combatants may take the opportunity to directly attack the military when they are in the area providing security or logistical assistance to NGOs. Conversely, local civilians may be intimidated by the presence of the military thus impacting the relief work of the NGO, and furthering the crises among the people as medical aid and food distribution can be negatively impacted. However real the security threat is, through effective communication, a real understanding of societal culture and the legitimate needs of the faith-based NGO, mutual support between the military and missionaries can be successfully accomplished within the bounds of established organizational culture.

Chapter 3: The Issue: Separation of Church and State

There are deeper concerns about cooperation between missionaries and the military. At the heart of the matter is the perceived conflict between church and state. The issue regarding religion is addressed in the First Amendment to the US Constitution that states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof..."

The perception is that military support of a faith-based organization is endorsement of that particular faith--perhaps to the exclusion of others. On the other hand, the perception is that if a faith-based organization were to cooperate with the military, they are now subservient to the state, which may prohibit their free exercise of faith--or at least limited to a conditional exercise. The somewhat unique American disdain for state-church confluence is turbulent enough in the peaceful society of the United States. It strikes an even more sensitive nerve when both organizations find themselves co-located abroad in a martial conflict or HADR scenario. A closer look at how the Department of Defense approaches religion in the military will provide perspective, and ease perceived tension in future cooperation.

Katcoff vs. Marsh questioned the Constitutionality of the US Army providing chaplains at government expense. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "Those who want the individual liberty embodied in our Bill of Rights must be willing to make sacrifices for it. One of these is the duty of a soldier to obey military orders and forego many of the freedoms he would otherwise enjoy as a civilian." One of the many "freedoms" referred to here is the free exercise of religion. Thus, the Second Circuit upheld the Army's Constitutional requirement to accommodate for religious practice in accordance with the First Amendment.

The Supreme Court has rendered several decisions regarding the military's obligation to accommodate religious practice. The Court has identified the uniqueness of service members'

particular duty to the Constitution, and upheld their right to seek and participate in religious services. The courts acknowledge that the inherent duty of military members requires them to be isolated from their religious communities. This duty to government deprives them of the opportunity to exercise their faith, and violates the prohibitive clause of the First Amendment. Additionally, the courts recognize that although the military is required to facilitate service members' religious expression, members are neither forced to participate (violating the establishment clause) nor receive punishment for their desire to avoid religious services offered by a chaplain.⁴ It is not the intent to review here all court decisions supporting the association of religion with the military, but merely demonstrate that the US Supreme Court and lower courts have provided the legal foundation for the military to "accommodate or facilitate, not favor or promote, religious exercise."⁵

The individual responsible for the accommodation of religious practice in the military is the US military chaplain. Department of Defense Instruction 1304.19 outlines the three roles chaplains serve: (1) "to advise and assist commanders in the discharge of their responsibilities to provide for the free exercise of religion in the context of military service as guaranteed by the Constitution"; (2) "to assist commanders in managing Religious Affairs"; and (3) "to serve as the principal advisors to commanders for all issues regarding the impact of religion on military operations." It is through this third advisory role that chaplains help commanders bridge the gap between the military and the missionary or faith-based NGO during military operations.

Religious affairs engagement reflects the whole-of-government approach championed in all areas of US Government planning regarding military operations abroad. The Department of Defense visualizes religious support under the broad concept of military engagement. Military engagement is defined as "the routine contact and interaction between individuals or elements of

the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another nation's armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain influence." Joint Publication 1-05 *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations* details several functions for the Joint Force Chaplain (JFCH) in regards to coordination and team building as part of military engagement. One role assigned to the JFCH for religious affairs is through interorganizational coordination by establishing relationships to boost interoperability, and advise the commander regarding mission requirements. Nongovernmental organizations generally, such as International Red Cross/Cresent and World Vision (listed as examples), are among the groups and agencies identified for collaboration. See Appendix A for a list of further examples.

Another command directed role relegated to the JFCH in their JF area of responsibility is assisting foreign militaries in their development of professional chaplaincies, which is part of building the strategic "partnership capacities in the areas of good governance, human dignity, and religious freedom." Chaplains in their liaison role maintain communication with indigenous religious leaders, communities, NGOs, allies, contractors, and may even minister to foreign nationals, all with command authorization. The Department of Defense has overtly identified religion as part of its approach to military operations by publishing JP 1-05. The chaplain, in his niche role administrating religious affairs, is an individual who contributes to the overall effectiveness of the Joint Force Commander's mission due to his specialized training and education. In fact, there are some circumstances when indigenous clergymen favor

communication vis-à-vis the chaplain. Chaplain coordinating activities are continually accomplished at all levels of operations. ¹

The overall goal of chaplain liaison as part of military engagement allows him or her to communicate with local leaders "on matters of religion to ameliorate suffering and to promote peace and the benevolent expression of religion. It is a focused and narrow role that addresses religion in human activity without employing religion to achieve a military advantage." Routine, inherent team-building coordination can be offered to missionaries and faith-based NGOs as a natural extension of the religious affairs role. In fact, through coordination with the Civil Military Operation Center, chaplains may serve as direct liaisons to NGOs that have "religious affiliation." At the discretion of the commander, the military chaplain will always provide a strong liaison for external command communications. And by affiliating religious missionaries and faith-based NGOs as part of the larger religious community, with their consent, missionaries can be one part of a commander's bridge to reach out to local community leaders and elders in areas where religion plays a major component of the host nation.

Chapter 4: Missionaries as Spies?

As specialists in religious affairs, missionaries and workers in faith-based NGOs possess very strong moral convictions about helping people in need. And therefore, they have very high ethical responsibilities to protect human life, which may include the lives of individuals assessed by the military as enemy combatants. When the military, in the natural course of gathering information about security threats, asks the missionary for assistance in identifying individuals or

¹ US Department of Defense, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, JP 1-05, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, November 13, 2009), pp. III-1-5, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_05.pdf#search="JP 1-05".

groups who may pose a credible threat to either military forces, faith-based NGO workers or civilians, the missionary is now in a moral dilemma. By answering, the missionary could provide information that may lead to a loss of human life, which is diametrically opposed to their moral fabric. This contrasts with the commander's moral and legal obligation to protect noncombatants while executing an operation. This type of scenario highlights missionaries aversion of their possible use as a "source" for intelligence.

It is helpful for the American missionary or faith-based NGO worker to know the legal requirements regarding the collection of intelligence by the military, or any other US intelligence agency abroad. Executive Order 12333 prohibits intelligence gathering on US citizens abroad, except under certain conditions. This order prevents physical surveillance of a US citizen abroad to obtain foreign intelligence, except to acquire "information that cannot reasonably be acquired by other means," i.e. casual observation or by verbal consent. Restrictions against monitoring include mail or electronic surveillance, monitoring devices, or unconsented physical searches. The head of the associated intelligence agency must first approve requests intended for any of the previous techniques that normally require a warrant. The final authority for approving the request resides with the Attorney General of the United States. This approval chain demonstrates the US Government's commitment to protect the rights of individual citizens--US-based missionaries and faith-based NGO workers included--even when outside the United States.

Department of Defense Regulation 5240.1-R specifically restricts the military from obtaining information about US citizens abroad that is not obtained through personal consent or

² Exec. Order No. 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, (December 4, 1981) [As amended by Exec. Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008)], pp. 1-13, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf.

information that is publically available. Additionally, only if US citizens abroad meet the following 13 criteria can the military pursue intelligence collection efforts after US Attorney General approval:¹⁴

- 1. "Individuals reasonably believed to be officers or employees, or otherwise acting for or on behalf, of a foreign power."
- 2. "An organization reasonably believed to be owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a foreign power."
- 3. "Persons or organizations reasonably believed to be engaged or about to engage, in international terrorist or international narcotics activities;"
- 4. "Persons who are reasonably believed to be prisoners of war; missing in action; or are the targets, the hostages, or victims of international terrorist organizations; or Corporations or other commercial organizations believed to have some relationship with foreign powers, organizations, or persons."
- 5. "Counterintelligence. Information may be collected about a United States person if the information constitutes counterintelligence, provided the intentional collection of counterintelligence about United States persons must be limited to:
 - a. Persons who are reasonably believed to be engaged in, or about to engage in, intelligence activities on behalf of a foreign power, or international terrorist activities.
 - b. Persons in contact with persons described in subparagraph [a], above, for the purpose of identifying such person and assessing their relationship with persons described in subparagraph [a], above.
 - c. Potential Sources of Assistance to Intelligence Activities. Information may be collected about United States persons reasonably believed to be potential sources of intelligence, or potential sources of assistance to intelligence activities, for the purpose of assessing their suitability or credibility. This category does not include investigations undertaken for personnel security purposes."
- 6. "Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods. Information may be collected about a United States person who has access to, had access to, or is otherwise in possession of, information that reveals foreign intelligence and counterintelligence sources or methods, when collection is reasonably believed necessary to protect against the unauthorized disclosure of such information; provided that within the United States, intentional collection of such information shall be limited to persons who are:
 - a. Present and former DoD employees;
 - b. Present or former employees of a present or former DoD contractor; and
 - c. Applicants for employment at the Department of Defense or at a contractor of the Department of Defense."
- 7. "Physical Security. Information may be collected about a United States person who is reasonably believed to threaten the physical security of DoD employees, installations, operations, or official visitors. Information may also be collected in the course of a lawful physical security investigation."
- 8. "Personnel Security. Information may be collected about a United States person that arises out of a lawful personnel security investigation."

- 9. "Communications Security. Information may be collected about a United States person that arises out of a lawful communications security investigation."
- 10. "Narcotics. Information may be collected about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be engaged in international narcotics activities."
- 11. "Threats to Safety. Information may be collected about a United States person when the information is needed to protect the safety of any person or organization, including those who are targets, victims, or hostages of international terrorist organizations."
- 12. "Overhead Reconnaissance. Information may be collected from overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific United States persons."
- 13. "Administrative Purposes. Information may be collected about a United States person that is necessary for administrative purposes."

There are restrictions placed on chaplains, among them: gathering intelligence; identifying targets; participating in operations designed to deceive; and leading official negotiations on behalf of the command. Military threat assessment information is usually attainable through a myriad of open-source (non-classified) origins and does not necessitate leveraging faith-based NGOs for information. Missionaries and faith-based NGO workers who understand these strict legal requirements are in place can be assured that their assistance to the military overseas in no way targets them as intelligence sources. It is clear from US law that religion and the military are completely compatible, and US citizens abroad should have no fear of being exploited as intelligence sources or targets for surveillance.

Chapter 5: The US Military's Inclusion of NGOs

For guidelines on how the military should approach religious missionaries abroad, the next step is to understand how the US Government and military view NGOs in particular.

Determining how the military interacts with NGOs specifically lends itself to coordinating with missionaries and faith-based NGOs, and helps determine what roles and services they potentially provide.

Joint doctrine takes priority over individual service doctrine, ¹⁶ and DoD has clearly identified NGOs and private civilian (if religious) organizations as "key proponents and participants" in the reconstruction and stabilization of countries. ¹⁷ Thus, commanders must consider planning NGO coordination requirements as part of their mission activities both within and outside their operational areas, ¹⁸ including the military's role in assisting NGOs when developing the overall mission statement. ¹⁹ That NGO assistance should be articulated within the mission statement expresses the importance DoD has regarding the integration of NGOs: "Working alone, alongside the US military, or with other US agencies, NGOs assist in all the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed."²⁰

Part of any mission planning for the military involves the intelligence preparation of the battlefield/battlespace (IPB). This is a process that generally identifies all the factors associated with a particular mission (combat or HADR), to include populations, terrain, social customs and religion. This preparation does not necessarily intend to target individuals or groups for intelligence gathering as has been previously discussed. The Marine Corps has identified NGOs as critical non-DoD entities to provide detailed information regarding a country's transportation infrastructure, medical capacity, and economic concerns when planning HADR missions. ²¹

As part of the IPB when planning for operations, NGOs are among those listed as organizations that are indigenous to the working area. Church organizations are also identified as part of those organizations present.²² As such, commanders are not only required to be familiar with organizations working in their area of operation (AO), but commanders must also be familiar with those organizations' actions, capabilities, restrictions, and how they might affect military operations. Depending on the activities of both the military and organization, coordination may be required. Often times the military will have greater resources than are

normally available to NGOs, and may be able to augment the NGO accordingly. Conversely, the NGO may have specialized capabilities they may share with the military. In any case, part of the commander's IPB should be prepared to identify, coordinate and provide assistance to NGOs, especially when it is mutually beneficial.³

Once organizations have been identified, the commander can then assess how they can be partners in meeting the needs of the host nation locals. Commanders often lack the necessary cultural relations specialists to provide social and cultural understanding in the AO, to include: language, traditions, customs, social behaviors, local history, and religious and ethnic distinctions. NGOs have been identified to provide gap coverage for these specialists. In addition to the previous needs, missionaries and faith-based NGOs can also provide the required "identification, preservation, and restoration of significant historical, cultural, social, and religious sites, facilities, artifacts, organizations, and systems." Additionally, as cultural relations specialists they may advise the local commander on civil assistance missions, or be a liaison to historical, cultural or religious organizations of a foreign government in friendly areas. 4

Another mission requirement commanders often have a shortfall in is interpreters.

Forward deployed units (Marine Expeditionary Units for example) may not have the requisite linguistic capability organic to their unit for rapid response missions. NGOs have been identified as providing gap coverage for interpreters as well.²⁴ Missionaries and faith-based NGOs may be

³ US Department of the Army and Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, FM 2-01.3 or MCRP 2-3A, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, December 2010), 7-3, https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_b/pdf/fm2_01x3c2.pdf

⁴ US Department of the Army and Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Civil Affairs Tactics*, *Techniques*, *and Procedures*, FM 3-05.401 or MCRP 3-33.1A, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, September 23, 2003) pp. 3-22,23, https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-401.pdf.

able to provide linguistic services in lieu of military organic interpreter assets. As part of a Civil Affairs (CA) linguistic team, missionaries could provide interpreter support by providing language training, or identifying trustworthy locals who could be contracted to provide linguistic support to the military. Serving only as an advisor to the CA team would be beneficial if the missionary chooses not to provide personal interpretation services.

A primary concern for commanders upon arrival in country for either combat or HADR missions is ensuring the needs of the local population are being met through food distribution, medical aid and supplies, shelter, and dislocated civilian camp organization. Most NGOs are already engaged in these operations and can provide an outlet for the resources available to the commander while the NGO continues to be the face and hands of relief, so then the commander can focus on other higher priorities. Missionaries and faith-based organizations that have established distribution procedures are best able to advise commanders on where additional relief camps can be established, and provide communication to locals on where additional aid stations are being established. These relief operations are most important during the early phases of a HADR mission, or soon as practicable in Phases 3 or 4 during conventional combat operations.

The Handbook for Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure identifies the Early Intervention Phase or the "Golden Hour" for intervening authorities "where they will enjoy the greatest credibility and tolerance from a host population anxious for their success. Since the crisis leading to the intervention is generally rife with governance deficiencies, improved systems will need to be put in place as soon as is practicable to correct them." ²⁶ Engaging faith-based NGOs and missionaries and utilizing their established systems contribute to the initial, immediate relief desired by the commander. Additionally, simple monitoring of aid stations set up by these organizations may help to provide measures of

effectiveness in those regions by assessing how many host nation individuals continue to seek aid there that is different than normal or pre-crisis levels.

While missionaries and faith-based NGOs can provide essential gap coverage, they are also uniquely positioned to support improved governance as operations begin. Their established work and garnered trust in the host nation (HN) provides a broad network of communications and public relations abilities. As such, they can help identify locals and businesses that could be hired for contract worker programs, which may help avoid corruption of relief programs by HN government intrusion. And because of their knowledge of the local state of affairs, missionaries can identify the singular cause of crisis, and provide advice on solving it.²⁷

Military coordination with faith-based NGOs or religious missionary efforts aid in establishing a peaceful transition of authority. Partnering with these faith-based organizations meets the intent of commanders whose first priority is usually preventing chaos from erupting, or reducing it by providing for the basic needs of individuals. Keeping the locals content prevents them from creating reasons for dissatisfaction, and removes an opportunity for disruptive elements to take advantage of recruiting opportunities by compelling disgruntled individuals to join factions whose intent is to cause lawlessness and violence. Thus, coordination with missionaries can help establish stability locally which contributes to overall security.

Finally, no integration with missionaries or faith-based NGOs would be possible without effective communication and coordination. Creation of the Joint Interagency Coordination Group and Civil Military Operation Center are designed to enhance the individual capabilities and coordinate the activities of regional and private organizations with the military.²⁸ Though missionaries and their organizations often fill religious, social, and economic roles that are routinely part of the whole-of-government-approach to stability operations, they may choose to

remain in a neutral capacity. The military fully understands that some faith-based organizations or other NGOs will refuse to interact with them for trepidation of losing their neutral status.²⁹ However, missionaries and faith-based NGOs would be best served with the understanding that the military identifies itself as secondary to, and supporting of NGOs, IGOs, and foreign government authorities in providing aid during humanitarian crisis.³⁰

Chapter 6: Missionary-Military Interactions: How It Really Works

A survey was created to assess how missionaries or faith-based NGOs have interacted with the military overseas (see Appendix B). The intent was to provide missionaries with an opportunity to communicate their experiences and use their input on the way forward for easier missionary-military cooperation in the future. Participants had the opportunity to keep their identities and organizations remain confidential in order to respect the sensitivity of their working locations.

Contact was made with missionary organizations of the major religious denominations in the United States as well as some of the faith-based organizations listed with Interaction. While there was some general interest in the topic, all except one organization declined to participate which resulted in only one completed survey. There were some independent missionaries from their local churches who expressed a desire to participate but did not return the survey within the allotted time. Further research failed to reveal any quantitative or subjective analysis of missionary-military interactions, a related issue identified elsewhere (see Petersen).

Chapter 7: Missionary Global Presence: Where Missionaries Are

Missionaries are typically classified by their time commitment to a particular country, generally short term (either two to three years), and career or long term (multiple consecutive terms). While qualifications vary by denomination, there may be age or familial dependent restrictions, minimum health requirements, and certain ecclesiastical affiliations and training. Once all prerequisites are satisfied, individuals are usually classified as apprentices who then assist veteran career missionaries on a two or three year term to determine the apprentice's ability to conduct their particular ministry work. The International Mission Board (IMB), a Southern Baptist Convention entity, reported that 35% of their career missionaries previously served in a short term mission or volunteer support role, with approximately 5,500 college graduates having served in those capacities since 1964.³¹

IMB had 4,857 missionaries deployed overseas at the end of 2011, and identified the following demographics:³²

- Married 87.3% (4,242); Single 12.7% (615)
- Women 53.8% (2,613); Men 46.2% (2,244)
- Long-term Personnel Age: mean 45, median 45, mode 33
- Short-term Personnel Age: mean 39, median 30, mode 25
- Length of service Long-term personnel: mean 11 years, median 9 years, mode 3 years

While IMB no longer lists the countries in which they have active missionaries for security reasons, their working locations can be inferred using the Global Status of Evangelical Christianity (GSEB).⁵

GSEB identifies those areas of the world in which less than two percent of the population is Christian or has exposure to Christianity. IMB identifies "unreached people groups" within those populations (or affinity groups), and those populations are associated with general geographical locations. ³³ IMB sends missionaries to those geographic locations associated with

⁵ "Annual Personnel Report," International Mission Board, *Research Data*, accessed March 19, 2013, http://public.imb.org/globalresearch/Pages/Research/DataAnnual.aspx.

the unreached people groups in these general areas: Americas, Central Asia, East Asia, European (to include Canada, Russia, and Australia), North Africa and Middle East, South Asia (India), and Southeast Asia. Although there are unreached people groups within North America, the focus for IMB is outside the continental United States. Based on previous open-source information where the Southern Baptist Convention has relationships in-country, their missionaries are also present in: Afghanistan, Benin, Cambodia, Chile, China, Gambia, India, Japan, Laos, Mali, Nepal, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Russia, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, and Uganda

Although IMB is one of the largest US-based missionary organizations, there are others who have a meaningful presence. The Assemblies of God World Missions include 2,708 missionaries, with 20,846 short term, all serving in 244 countries. As a denomination, they boast a constituency of over 65 million, 95% of which are outside the continental United States and mainly in Latin America, Caribbean, and Africa.³⁴ The Presbyterian Mission Agency, part of the Presbyterian Church (USA), has 200 missionaries in 50 countries. And there are 94 million members of the worldwide Presbyterian Church due to US missionary work alone.³⁵

The intent is not to delineate the demographics and working areas of all US missionaries or faith-based NGOs. However, the fact that Christian missionaries from the United States alone constitute an estimated 127,000 of the 400,000 missionaries sent abroad each year demonstrates the commitment of these organizations.³⁶ And that estimate may be low considering there are approximately 1,015 independent US-based Christian mission organizations with established work in foreign countries.³⁷ In terms of scale, a group of 127,000 equates to the size of 75% of the entire US Marine Corps (in 2013). The missionary geographic influence combined with the efforts of faith-based NGOs, such as World Vision who has an annual budget of 1.6 billion US

dollars,³⁸ is considerable. Appendix C, Figure 1 graphically depicts conflict areas in the world in 2012. This is compared to Figure 2 that depicts the impacts and trends of missionaries worldwide. Taken together it is apparent that when the United States responds to these conflict areas, missionaries will be present.

The significance of missionary impact upon the peoples and cultures they work with cannot be underestimated. As missionaries continue their work in both the social and religious aspects, they are potentially in contact with millions of foreigners every year. And as those missionaries build churches when locals convert or assume a Christian identity, this reflects a tremendous shift towards a Judeo/Christian ethic and moral base to which 77% of Americans also generally subscribe.³⁹ This can be extremely beneficial when US armed forces arrive, though they may have cultural differences from the host nation members, they can come together based on common moral and ethical principles to serve the best interests of the host nation.

Chapter 8: Recommendations on the Way Forward

While initial reaction to the idea of studying missionary-military interaction was generally agreeable, the following quote best articulates the general, if not official, policy of most US church missions organizations: "The...Church, as a national church, should guard against functioning as an agent of government or being used to further government foreign policy objectives as an institution, in its mission endeavors, or through its employees." This seems to indicate that this particular religious organization would not accept aid from the US Government or military, even when that aid would benefit the locals they normally provide religious and materiel aid. Seemingly, this would place the missionary in a difficult position during a humanitarian crisis when aid is being freely provided to locals from the US military, but

the missionary is refusing aid they could also distribute simply because it is sourced by the US Government.

Part of the unwillingness of religious missionaries to accept aid, or cooperate in distributing aid, is the fear of appearing as "an agent of government" which has been previously articulated. However, the real perception that they may be puppets "used to further government foreign policy" is a failure to understand the relationship the US Government actually has with NGOs generally vis-à-vis the military. The goal is to reconcile any misunderstandings in order for missionaries and faith-based NGOs to facilitate working relationships with the military so that in times of crisis, aid and assistance can be provided to the constituents of missionaries.

The first step in reconciliation is perspective. Marie Petersen cites several factors that have led to the almost "fashionable" acceptance of religion on the world stage of humanitarian aid. First, secularization and modernization theses have been called into question based on the role religion has played in impacting world movements, i.e. the impact of the Catholic Church in Eastern Europe democratic transitions; advancement of Pentecostalism in Latin America; and 9/11 to name a few. Second is the prominence that faith-based organizations (FBO) have achieved in the last decade. For example, US Government funding of FBOs increased from 10.5% in 2001 to 19.9% in 2005, nearly double. And World Bank now estimates that FBOs supply nearly 50% of all education and health services in Sub-Saharan Africa. Third, criticism of the World Bank and others for failures of structural adjustment programs in the 80's and 90's resulted in a movement toward an increasingly holistic idea of development—"civil society', 'human development' and 'participation'"—and away from liberal state and market-led approaches. World Bank's study in 2000 found that "many poor people had more confidence in religious organizations than in government or secular organizations." Clearly, religious

organizations have their place not only at the world table, but a legitimate role in the whole-of-government approach to stability and security.⁶

The second step towards reconciliation is engagement. The American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction) is the largest alliance of US-based NGOs consisting of 180 faith-based and secular organizations. Each year, individuals, private institutions, and the US Government provide \$13 billion to InterAction members. Interaction serves as a coordinating organization to NGOs, able to foster education through training, workshops, and working groups that serve as the groundwork for best practices formulation. Membership may help provide additional monetary capital to missionaries and faith-based NGOs who conduct work in addition to religious proselytization such as AIDS medical treatment assistance, management of orphanages, or social justice promotion. Faith-based NGOs who provide a broad spectrum of outreach programs are likely primary partners due to their ability to diversify. Missionary parent organizations and faith-based NGOs should consider joining InterAction, or at a minimum foster professional liaisons with them in order to take advantage of their best practices when working with the military overseas.

The final step of reconciliation is communication. That not one of the ten largest US

Christian mission organizations participated in an academic survey to assess missionary-military interaction reveals an apparent lack of understanding of the position they have in determining how those interactions take place. The military is in no better position to facilitate planning and cooperation when organizations they will potentially collaborate with remain silent on how to

⁶ Marie J. Petersen, "International Religious NGOs at The United Nations: A Study of a Group of Religious Organizations," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, November 17, 2010, http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/847.

⁷ "Our Members," Interaction, *About Our Members*, accessed March 21, 2013, http://www.interaction.org/about-interaction

effectively negotiate working relationships, or professionally avoid them. While organizational direct communication with the military may be prohibitive, under the auspices of a parent organization such as InterAction, communication would be more receptive and meaningful.

The position of the military towards NGOs has been previously discussed. However, it merits mentioning that DoD would like to "Increase awareness and encourage contact between the military and NGOs...through symposia meetings, briefings, and joint planning sessions." Additionally, they suggest incorporating NGO training with military training exercises; and to have military members and units incorporated into NGO training to further encourage interaction. One low profile possibility is to have Marines who have finished Foreign Area Officer training conduct a structured liaison with a missionary or faith-based NGO while completing their one-year language immersion. This would serve to not only build the cultural understanding and language ability of the Marine, but also serve to create trust and articulate the role of the military to the missionary in a non-threatening environment.

There are a myriad of possibilities to implement meaningful cooperation and learning between the military and missionaries or faith-based NGOs. Missionary organizations may not be aware that the military has signaled its willingness to build relationships with NGOs. The Department of Defense should extend an invitation to faith-based organizations through InterAction to promote engagement and facilitate transparency. Since NGOs provide assistance to 250 million people each year, ⁴⁴ and FBOs constitute 10% of the membership of Economic and Social Council in the United Nations, ⁴⁵ missionary organizations and faith-based NGOs cannot be left out of the whole-of-government approach to HADR and stability operations.

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Missionaries and other faith-based organizations have a worldwide presence that cannot be ignored. Though they may primarily provide religious support, they also may engage in other humanitarian and social outreach programs. These organizations are often in country for years prior to a conflict, and persist in their work long after the conflict ends.

While missionaries have legitimate security reservations regarding cooperation with the military (especially in areas hostile to their own presence), concern over church and state discord is alleviated through examination of the law. The Supreme Court and lower courts have repeatedly affirmed the inclusion of religion and religious practices in the military. And the Department of Defense has highlighted religious engagement with foreign militaries through the military chaplain, reflecting a whole-of-government approach to cooperation. The chaplain may even provide religious support to foreign nationals, and liaison with native religious leaders and the local community at the commander's discretion. These concepts taken together should ameliorate any concerns missionaries have in cooperating with the military from a church-state viewpoint.

The presence of any US civilian organization in a foreign country during a conflict creates security and cooperation challenges when the military arrives in theatre. Missionaries and faith-based organizations, bound to a high moral and ethical foundations that are devoted to the preservation of life, fear being used as intelligence sources that may contribute to the loss of life. Executive Order prevents US citizens abroad from being exploited for intelligence purposes. Only if a US citizen is determined to be a member of, or acting on behalf of a foreign power can they have intelligence collected on them. Accordingly, missionaries should not have apprehension they are being exploited as intelligence sources. Additionally, faith-based organizations should anticipate they will have security provided for them regardless of whether

they choose, or choose not, to provide any information to the military. It is universally understood that any NGO reserves the right to not cooperate with the military under any circumstance.

The United States has a large Christian missionary presence overseas, and coupled with a substantial number of non-proselytizing FBOs, they are part of a conduit which provides 50% of all health and education services just in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. Missionaries and faith-based NGOs are in nearly every country around the world, impacting the culture and social climate, and introducing a moral and ethical ideology that 77% of all Americans share. This shared ideology is a basis for cooperation between missionaries and the military in order to meet the needs of the suffering during times of conflict.

Missionaries and faith-based NGOs may decide they do not wish to cooperate with the military during martial conflict where the United States acts alone. Or, they may determine that during humanitarian crisis when the United States intervenes along with coalition partners, that circumstance is sufficient to maintain their neutrality and can pursue cooperative agreements. There may be a host of complex circumstances when missionaries may cooperate with the military for unity of effort. But faith-based organizations must be transparent and willing to communicate those circumstances in order to foster building foundations for working relationships. They may wish to never participate under any circumstances, and that should also be communicated.

Finally, the military should interact with and treat overseas religious missionaries and their parent organizations for what they are: non-governmental organizations, which happen to be faith-based. Doing so creates predictable guidelines for cooperation during unpredictable circumstances. Because of missionaries' worldwide presence, it is inevitable that the military

commander will come into contact with them. Commanders should be prepared to offer assistance under the same circumstances he would to any other NGO. The military chaplain will always be able to assess missionary or faith-based organizations' interoperability, and advise the commander regarding religious affairs. However, the fact that an NGO represents or is associated with a particular religion does not negate their potential role in stability or HADR operations.

APPENDIX A

EXAMPLES OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL COORDINATION FOR RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS⁸

Interagency:

Department of State

Federal Bureau of Investigation

United States Agency for International Development

Intergovernmental:

United Nations

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

African Union

Multinational:

America

Britain

Canada

Australia

New Zealand

Nongovernmental:

International Red Cross/Crescent

World Vision

Research Institutions

Contractors

⁸ US Department of Defense, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, JP 1-05, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, November 13, 2009), II-12, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_05.pdf#search="JP 1-05".

APPENDIX B

Survey to Assess Missionary/Faith-Based NGO Interactions with the Military

Name:	Organization:	Date:
In	itial here if you choose to have your nam	e and or organization remain confidential
		n missionaries or faith-based organizations
		The results of this survey will be published
		relations abroad. Please use the additional
		e further explanation for your answers. Be
	annotate the number of the question you are red via e-mail and sent to [email address w	e continuing, if applicable. All surveys may
	vers by March 12, 2013. If you know of fe	- L
		please forward this survey to them. Thank
	articipation.	•
1. Have	you operated in any country where United	States military forces conducted operations?
0	Yes	
0	No	
0	Where?	
2. How	long had you served in that country prior to	the military operation?
0	Less than one year	
0	1-5 years	
0	6-10 years	
0	Over 10 years	
•	ou have prior knowledge of military forces	arrival or mission?
0	Yes	
0	No	
0	I arrived after the military began their op	erations
0	If yes, how?	
4. Did n		y contact you prior to the military's arrival?
0	Yes	
0	No	
-	ou provide any cultural or religious inform	ation assistance, or perform translation
servic	es to military forces?	
0	Yes	
0	No	
	your organization provide guidelines on de	aling with military forces or a host nation
milita		
0	- **	
0	No	
\circ	Don't know	

	0	If yes, what are the guidelines?
7.	Did m	ilitary forces provide security, medical, or logistical support for your mission?
	0	Yes
	0	No
8.	Did th	e presence of military forces positively or negatively impact your work?
	0	Positively
	0	Negatively
	0	No impact
	0	Don't know
	0	How specifically was it impacted positively or negatively?
9.	Did yo	ou perceive a difference in how the military interacted with you versus other missionary
	organi	zations, faith-based NGOs or non-religious NGOs?
	0	Yes
	0	No
	0	Don't know
10.	-	ou receive direct or indirect financial aid, or supplementary support from any other
		USAID, or Department of State as part of the overall military operation?
	0	Yes
	0	No
11.	Did a	military chaplain contact you?
	0	Yes
	0	No
		How?
12.	Did yo	ou have any fears about assisting military forces?
	0	Yes
	0	No
10	0	If yes, why?
13.	•	ou communicate with military forces if they negatively affected your operations?
	0	Yes
	0	No Did the military change enviling to mitigate your concerns?
		Did the military change anything to mitigate your concerns?Yes
11	Did w	
14.	•	ou know the military is concerned with integrating NGOs (who are willing to do so) mission planning, conducting operations, and post-mission stabilization based on
	NGOs	unique skill set?

o Yes

- 15. Are you familiar with the U.S. Institute of Peace handbook: *Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Missions*?
 - o Yes
 - o No
- 16. Are you familiar with the U.S. Institute of Peace, *Guidelines for Relations Between US*Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments?
 - o Yes
 - o No
- 17. What advice do you have for missionaries interacting with military forces?
- 18. What advice do you have for military forces interacting with missionaries or faith-based organizations?
- 19. **Comments**:

APPENDIX C

Figure 1. World Conflict Map 2012

Source: Data information by Aviation Week's Defense Technology International; Map designed by GIZMODO, http://gizmodo.com/5875194/all-the-worlds-wars-and-conflicts-coming-in-2012.





Figure 2. Map Showcasing World Missionary Trends

Source: US Center for World Mission, Joshua Project: http://joshuaproject.net/assets/ maps/encouraging-mission-trends-map.pdf.



Glossary

	Area of Operation
CA	
DoD	Department of Defense
FBO	Faith-Based Organization
HADR	Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief
HN	Host Nation
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IMB	International Mission Board
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace
JF	Joint Force
JP	Joint Publication
JFCH	Joint Force Chaplain
MEU	
	Non-Governmental Organization

Notes

¹ US Department of the Army and Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace*, FM 2-01.3 or MCRP 2-3A, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, December 2010), 4-4, https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_b/pdf/fm2_01x3c2.pdf

² US Const. Amend. I.

³ Katcoff vs. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 233 (2d Cir. 1985).

⁴ R. Chuck Mason and Cynthia Brouser, *Military Personnel and Freedom of Religion: Selected Legal Issues*. CRS Report for Congress CRS-2011-AML-0069. (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, February 1, 2011), 5, http://congressional.proquest.com/congressional/docview/t21.d22.crs-2011-aml-0069?accountid=14746.

⁵ Mason, 5.

⁶ US Department of Defense, *Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments*, DOD Dir. 1304.19, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, April 23, 2007), 4.1, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/130419p.pdf.

⁷ US Department of Defense, *Religious Affairs in Joint Operations*, JP 1-05, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, November 13, 2009), III-4, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_05.pdf#search="JP 1-05".

⁸ JP 1-05, pp. II-12, III-1.

⁹ JP 1-05, II-6.

¹⁰ JP 1-05, pp. III-4-5.

¹¹ US Department of Defense, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, JP 3-29, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, March 17, 2009), xxvii, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_29.pdf.

¹² FM 2-01.3 or MCRP 2-3A, 3-17.

¹³ Exec. Order No. 12333, United States Intelligence Activities, (December 4, 1981) [As amended by Exec. Orders 13284 (2003), 13355 (2004) and 13470 (2008)], 13, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo/eo-12333-2008.pdf.

¹⁴ US Department of Defense, *Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons*, Regulation 5240.1-R, December 1982, 15-18, http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/524001r.pdf.

¹⁵ JP 1-05, III-5.

¹⁶ US Department of Defense, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 1, (Washington DC: US Department of Defense, March 20, 2009), VI-3, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf.

¹⁷ US Department of Defense, *Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization: Unified Action Handbook Series Book One* (Washington, DC: United States Joint Forces Command, February 17, 2010), II-5, https://www.pksoi.org/document_repository/doc_lib/JFCOM_IMS_Hndbk.pdf.

¹⁸ JP 1. VIII-1.

¹⁹ JP 3-29, xii.

²⁰ JP 3-29, xvii.

²² FM 2-01.3/MCRP 2-3A, 3-17.

²⁴ FM 3-05.401 or MCRP 3-33.1A, Appendix F.

²⁵ JP 3-29, x-xi.

²⁷ DoD, Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, II-5.

²⁸ JP 1, pp. VII 5,6.

²⁹ DoD, Handbook for Military Participation in the Interagency Management System for Reconstruction and Stabilization, pp. II-7,8.

³⁰ JP 3-29, I-1.

³¹ "Journeyman," International Mission Board, accessed March 19, 2013, http://going.imb. org/2to3yr/journeyman.asp.

³² "Annual Personnel Report," International Mission Board, *Research Data*, accessed March 19, 2013, http://public.imb.org/globalresearch/Pages/ResearchDataAnnual.aspx.

³³ "Understand," PeopleGroups.org, 2013-02 GSEC Listing of Unreached People Groups, accessed March 19, 2013, http://peoplegroups.org/understand/112.aspx.

³⁴ "Missions Resources," The General Council of the Assemblies of God, *AGWM Vital Stats*, accessed March 21, 2013, http://agchurches.org/Sitefiles/Default/RSS/AGWM %20 Documents/AGWMVitalstats.pdf.

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³⁸ Marie J. Petersen, "International Religious NGOs at The United Nations: A Study of a Group of Religious Organizations," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, November 17, 2010, http://sites.tufts.edu/jha/archives/847.

³⁹ "Gallup Politics," Gallup, Inc., *In US, 77% Identify as Christian*, accessed March 21, 2013, http://www.gallup.com/poll/159548/identify-christian.aspx.

⁴⁰ Email response from Organizational Director, World Missions, February 28, 2013. Due to sensitivity, name and organization were withheld.

⁴¹ Petersen.

²¹ US Department of the Navy and Headquarters US Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication, *Intelligence Operations*, MCWP 2-1, (Washington DC: US Department of the Navy, September 10, 2003), 7-3, http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/usmc/mcwp2-1.pdf.

²³ US Department of the Army and Headquarters US Marine Corps, *Civil Affairs Tactics*, *Techniques, and Procedures*, FM 3-05.401 or MCRP 3-33.1A, (Washington, DC: US Department of the Army, September 23, 2003) pp. 3-22,23, https://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-05-401.pdf.

²⁶ US Department of Defense, *Handbook for Military Support to Essential Services and Critical Infrastructure: Unified Action Handbook Series Book Two* (Washington, DC: United States Joint Forces Command, February 2, 2010), II-21, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/ doctrine/jwfc/esci_hbk.pdf.

⁴² "Our Members," Interaction, *About Our Members*, accessed March 21, 2013, http://www.interaction.org/about-interaction
⁴³ JP 3-39, II-29.
⁴⁴ US Department of Defense, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, *JP 3-*

^{08, (}Washington DC: US Department of Defense, March 17, 2006), II-16, http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_08.pdf. ⁴⁵ Petersen.

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